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Lags and Optimal Control Methods of
Setting Interest Rates
A
lthough it is a generally accepted stylized
fact that, as Milton Friedman noted, the
monetary policy transmission mechanism
has “long and variable lags,” most of the early
theoretical work on these issues, e.g., the rules
versus discretion debate, proceeded on the assump-
tion that monetary policy measures were instantly
transmitted to inflation. (See Barro and Gordon,
1983, and Cukierman, 1992.) Thus in his basic
model, Cukierman (1992, Chap. 3, p. 28) states
that “Abstracting from real shocks, growth and
changes in velocity, the rate of inflation is equal to
the rate of monetary growth m. Hence inflationary
expectations are equal to expected money growth
me, and the short-run Phillips relation…can be re-
stated as N–Nn=α(m–me), where N is employment
and Nn the natural rate of employment.”
Since then analysis has become more realistic.
Most theorists now accept that the policy instru-
ment that central banks actually adjust is the
short-term rate of interest, and not a monetary
aggregate (though some still regret this fact). More-
over, the standard work-horse models now in
current use, especially Rudebusch and Svensson
(originally 1997, now 1999a), do incorporate
monetary transmission lags. The Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) addressed this issue, of the lags
in the transmission mechanism, in its report, “The
Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy,”
(Bank of England, 1999)—a publication intended
for an audience beyond academic experts in the
subject. The existence of such lags raises questions
about how interest rates should be set currently at
time t to achieve future objectives at time t+n.
Typically it is supposed that interest rates do not
affect current goal variables instantaneously; and,
in so far as they can affect certain (intermediate)
variables immediately (e.g., exchange rates), they
may only do so at the cost of destabilizing other
goal variables subsequently (e.g., output).
Academic studies of the way in which interest
rates might be set in such a forward-looking con-
text involve a number of dimensions. The three
dimensions required for study are the model, the
structure of shocks, and the loss function. In such
cases, the optimal policy horizon over which infla-
tion returns to target is determined endogenously
within the model, as we will discuss subsequently
when I report work by Batini and Nelson from the
Bank of England. In practice, however, very few
central banks, or monetary authorities, set mone-
tary policy by such optimal control methods.
There are no doubt various reasons why this is
so. As will be described in Section II, which reports
work undertaken within the Bank, such optimal
control horizons appear very sensitive to the pre-
cise model/shock specification applied. Moreover,
all the models on which such exercises have been
attempted have been small and simplified. As will
be discussed, it remains unclear how successfully,
if at all, optimal control techniques could be ap-
plied in the context of the larger models used in
practice for forecasting purposes.
Last, but not least, such an approach requires
specification of a loss function, for which the appro-
priate discount rate must be included. Because of
the complexity and difficulty of such an exercise,
governments have not been prepared to do so.
Instead they have usually restricted themselves to
giving primacy to the objective of price stability,
while accepting that some conditions may exist in
which the monetary authorities should not aim to
return inflation to target excessively quickly, since
that might impart undue volatility to output.
In the case of the United Kingdom, the Chan-
cellor set out the proposed target in his letter,
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June 3, 1998, to the Governor of the Bank of
England, writing 
The operational target for monetary policy
remains an underlying inflation rate (mea-
sured by the 12 month increase in the RPI
[retail price index] excluding mortgage
interest payments) of 21/2 per cent. The
inflation target is 21/2 per cent at all times:
that is the rate which the MPC is required to
achieve and for which it is accountable…
The framework takes into account that any
economy at some point can suffer from
external events or temporary difficulties,
often beyond its control. The framework
is based on the recognition that the actual
inflation rate will on occasions depart from
its target as a result of shocks and distur-
bances. Attempts to keep inflation at the
inflation target in these circumstances may
cause undesirable volatility in output.
If the government is not prepared to define the
loss function, a central bank without goal indepen-
dence is not constitutionally in a strong position to
do so on its own. So, for a combination of reasons
central banks have generally given weight to a
variety of operational procedures, which do not
involve conscious optimization conditional on an
assumed loss function. This will involve another
set of dimensions, specifically that choice of oper-
ational technique (e.g., some kind of feedback rule)
and what forecast horizon to set for operating this
rule (since the horizon now becomes a choice
variable as well). This is discussed further in
Section III.
The Rudebusch/Svensson Model and
Its Findings on Alternative Policy
Horizons
In their excellent paper, Rudebusch and
Svensson (R/S) (1999b) consider a variety of such
operational techniques in the context of a simple
calibrated two-equation model of the U.S. econ-
omy, and various alternative versions of their
assumed loss function. Then they seek to compare
the loss from each procedure with the loss from
using the benchmark optimal control approach.
The operational techniques that they examine
include (i) the Taylor rule, (ii) a forward- (eight
quarter) looking Taylor rule, (iii) an instrument rule
that responds to a rule-consistent inflation forecast,
(iv) a strict inflation target (where output deviations
are given no weight), and (v) a flexible inflation
target (where such deviations are given weight). In
all cases such techniques are examined both with
and without interest rate smoothing.
In the case of the forward-looking Taylor rule,
the horizon was, somewhat arbitrarily, set at 8
quarters; while for instrument rule (iii) above and
for the strict and flexible inflation targets (iv and v
above), the horizons are again somewhat arbitrarily
set at 8, 12, and 16 quarters, respectively.1 R/S look
at losses relative to the benchmark optimal control
(OC) case in five tables (5.3 through 5.7) relating to
various configurations of parameters in the loss
function. Out of the 25 permutations (five tech-
niques with differing horizons, five tables with
differing loss functions), the shortest horizon gave
the worst outcome in 21 cases and the best in 2;
the 12-quarter horizon gave the worst in 0 cases
and the best in 8 cases; and the 4-year, 16-quarter
horizon (the longest) was the worst in 4 cases and
the best in 15.
Although R/S do not focus strongly on the
optimal horizon length, the implication of their
findings appears to be that overall economic
(adjustment) costs are reduced if the horizon for
inflation targetry is considerably longer than nor-
mally practiced, at least in the U.K., where the
horizon for the inflation fan chart is two years.2
There may be several reasons for this difference
between their U.S. analytical results and U.K.
practice. One might be that the monetary policy
transmission lag is somewhat shorter in more
open economies, since exchange rates typically
adjust faster than real output in response to an
interest rate change. Another reason could be that
the R/S model is backward-looking; in models
with forward-looking elements the transmission
process is generally speedier.
1 The word “horizon” looks simple enough, but, as Svensson has
demonstrated in several papers, semantic complexities abound in
this field. Horizon can merely mean the end of the forecast, where-
as “policy horizon” is usually taken to imply the date at which the
objectives of policy are approximately obtained; and “forecast hori-
zon” implies the future date at which the policy makers react to
deviations of the objective(s) from their desired level. As described
in more detail in Section II, the forecast and policy horizons often
differ, and can obviously diverge from the length of the published
forecast. In the above case, the R/S paper is examining forecast
horizons.
2 As described further in Section II, the evidence suggests that this is
the MPC’s policy horizon, as well as the end-point of the published
fan chart.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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The Structure of the Remainder of this
Paper
Be that as it may, in Section II of this paper I
shall review and summarize some current work
being done in the Bank on this subject of the opti-
mal horizon for monetary policy.
Another feature of U.K. procedures is that the
inflation forecast is based on (i.e., conditional on)
the assumption that interest rates are held constant
thereafter over the remaining two years. As R/S
note (p. 13), this was originally done at the Bank
because (before operational independence in 1997)
it could not presuppose future policy changes by
the government. That particular constraint has
now gone. In Section III I shall offer a few specula-
tive comments on whether that procedure remains
appropriate or whether some alternative time-path
might instead be adopted. So Section II will con-
centrate on Bank work on horizons, and then
Section III on some less substantial personal mus-
ings on time-paths.
A Digression on the Periodicity of
Decision-Making Meetings and
Forecasts
Before moving on to these issues, however, I
want to digress for a moment on the subject of
periodicity. The R/S model is a clever combination
of annual averages and quarterly data points. In
their paper, the periodicity of both the forecasting
process and the decision-making process is implic-
itly assumed to be quarterly. In practice in almost
all countries, the periodicity of the decision-making
process is higher (more frequent) than that of the
forecasting process. This is partly because the
decision-makers can subjectively update the fore-
casts in the light of incoming news at less expense
in terms of the use of skilled resources; so it is
probably optimal to reconsider decisions with a
higher frequency than formal, comprehensive
forecasts. Nevertheless formal forecasts could be
undertaken at almost any frequency, as also could
policy decisions. 
There seems, on the basis of casual empiricism,
to be more international uniformity amongst
developed nations on the preferred periodicity of
formal forecasting processes for monetary policy
purposes (quarterly) than on the preferred fre-
quency for decision-making. The Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) meets eight times a
year, but can (and does) make inter-meeting policy
changes; the Bank of England and the Bank of
Japan meet once a month (without inter-meeting
changes so far, since the grant of operational inde-
pendence); and the European Central Bank meets
twice a month, but will normally only consider the
monetary policy decision in depth at one of these
meetings. Given that the frequency of both these
processes can be chosen, and is not ineluctably
and exogenously determined, there has been not-
ably little analysis on what might be the optimal
periodicity for either process. Instead, the frequen-
cies seem to have evolved by practice, convention,
and shared experience without much (any?) formal
(e.g., cost/benefit) analysis. Perhaps this is desirable?
II. HORIZONS
The Horizon in the U.K.
The Chancellor’s letters to the MPC, specifying
the target (2.5 percent for RPIX, where RPIX is the
standard retail price index excluding X, which are
the components of the index directly affected by
interest rate changes, specifically the mortgage cost
component of housing services prices) that the MPC
seeks to achieve, have not set any finite horizon
for the achievement of that target, thus requiring it
to be met indefinitely. Nevertheless the wording of
these letters indicates that some short-run flexi-
bility, to allow for the occurrence of supply shocks
and to limit excessive short-run volatility in output,
would be both acceptable and desirable. (The rele-
vant wording in the letter of June 3, 1998, was noted
earlier in Section I.)
In practice, the MPC has published inflation
(and output) fan charts that extend two years into
the future. Moreover, observers will have noted
that, without exception, all the fan charts for infla-
tion published since the MPC was established have
shown RPIX very close to target in the quarters
near the terminal date, but deviating somewhat
more (though rarely by much) in the prior quarters.
The fan charts for inflation for the forecasts in
February and May 2000 are shown in Figures 1
and 2. The implication of these findings would
seem to be that a horizon of about 18 to 24 months
is also the policy horizon of the MPC.
In the meantime, staff at the Bank of England
have been exploring in a more formal analytic
mode the factors that might determine the choice
of an appropriate (perhaps optimal) horizon. The
first of the two papers that I shall describe here is168 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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by Batini and Haldane (B/H) (1999).
The Batini/Haldane Study
In this study B/H establish and calibrate a five-
equation model for the U.K.; an IS curve with real
interest rate and real exchange rate terms; an LM
demand for money function; an uncovered interest
parity condition for the nominal exchange rate; a
supply side equation based on a staggered con-
tracting model, and an equation in which overall
inflation relates both to domestic and to imported
inflation (import pass through). Against the back-
ground of this (numerically calibrated) model,
they then explore the (simulated) implications of
imposing a class of relatively simple inflation
forecast-based rules of the form:
where rt denotes the short-term ex ante
real rate of interest,  , where
it is the nominal interest rate; rt* denotes
the equilibrium value of the real interest
rate; 
,
where Φt is the information set available at
time t and E is the mathematical expecta-





c is the log of the consumer price
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index); and π* is the inflation target.
According to the rule, the monetary
authorities control deterministically the
nominal interest rate (it) so as to hit a path
for the short-term real interest rate (rt).
The short real rate is in turn set relative to
some steady-state value, determined by a
weighted combination of lagged and equi-
librium real interest rates. The novel fea-
ture of the rule, however, is the feedback
term. Deviations of expected inflation—
the feedback variable—from the inflation
target—the policy goal—elicit remedial
policy actions.
The policy choice variables for the
authorities are the parameter triplet {j,θ,γ}.
The parameter γ measures the degree of
interest rate smoothing (see Williams,
1997). So, for example, with γ=0 there is
no instrument smoothing. θ is a policy
feedback parameter. Higher values of θ
imply a more aggressive policy response
for a given deviation of the inflation fore-
cast from its target. Finally, j is the target-
ing horizon of the central bank when
forming its policy. For example, in the
United Kingdom, the Bank of England
feeds back from an inflation forecast
around two years ahead (King, 1997). The
horizon of the inflation forecast ( j) and
Figure 1
February 2000:  Current RPIX Inflation
Projection Based on Constant Nominal
Interest Rates at 6 Percent
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Figure 2
May 2000:  Current RPIX Inflation
Projection Based on Constant Nominal
Interest Rates at 6 Percent
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the size of the feedback coefficient (θ), as
well as the degree of instrument smooth-
ing (γ), dictate the speed at which inflation
is brought back to target following infla-
tionary disturbances. Because they influ-
ence the transition path of inflation, these
policy parameters clearly also have a bear-
ing on output dynamics. (B/H, pp. 8-9)
Of particular interest, both to the authors B/H
and in this context, is what happens to the econ-
omy as the coefficient j (the forecast horizon) is
varied. One feature of the model (and of the
actual experience of open economies) is that the
speed of the effect of monetary policy on infla-
tion is very sensitive to the impact of interest
rates on exchange rates and thence on imported
inflation. So, as B/H state, they experiment with
two versions, one “assuming full and immediate
import-price pass-through (a shorter transmission
lag); the other, no immediate pass-through (a
longer transmission lag).” With the other two
choice parameters, (γ, θ) set at their assumed 0.5
baseline values, and the calibrated values for the
equations in the model, B/H obtain the resulting
outcomes for output variability and inflation vari-
ability shown in their Chart 2, reproduced here
as Figure 3.
As B/H state:
Several points are clear from Chart 2. First,
irrespective of the assumed degree of pass-
through, the optimal forecast horizon is
always positive and lies somewhere be-
tween three and six quarters ahead. This
forecast horizon secures as good inflation
performance as any other, while at the
same time delivering lowest output vari-
ability. The latter result arises because
three to six quarters is around the horizon
at which monetary policy has its largest
marginal impact. The (integral of the real)
interest and exchange rate changes neces-
sary to hit the inflation target is minimised
at this horizon. So too, therefore, is the
degree of output destabilisation (the inte-
gral of output losses). At shorter horizons
than this, the adjustment in monetary pol-
icy necessary to return inflation to target
is that much greater—the upshot of which
is a destabilisation of output. Once we allow
for the fact that central banks in practice
feed back from annual inflation rates,
whereas our model-based feedback vari-
able is a quarterly inflation rate, then the
optimal forecast horizon implied by our
simulations (of three to six quarters) is
rather similar to that used by inflation-
targeting central banks in practice (of six
to eight quarters).3
Second, taking either pass-through
assumption, feeding back from a forecast
horizon much beyond six quarters leads
to worse outcomes for both inflation and
output variability. This is the flip-side of
the arguments used above. Just as short-
horizon targeting implies “too much” of a
policy response to counteract shocks, long-
horizon targeting can equally imply that
policy does “too little,” thereby setting in
train a destabilising expectational feed-
back. (p. 28)
They also note further, in their conclusions: 
An inflation forecast-based rule, with an
appropriately chosen targeting horizon,
naturally embodies a degree of output-
stabilisation. Moreover, any degree of
output-smoothing can be synthetically
3 This comparison is also not exact, because the two definitions of
horizon are different: the feedback horizon in the rule and the poli-
cy horizon in practice (the point at which expected inflation is in
line with the inflation target) are distinct concepts.
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recreated by judicious choice of the param-
eters entering an inflation forecast-based
rule. There is no need for any explicit out-
put terms to enter this rule. That is evidence
of the output-encompassing nature of in-
flation targeting based around inflation
forecasts. (p. 41)
A feature of this exercise that will be explored
further in the next section is that the time path of
interest rates (both nominal and real) that emanates
(and can be predicted to result) from this approach
(i.e., a rule-based response of deviations of fore-
cast from target inflation at some future horizon)
will neither be constant (i.e., unchanged from the
present) nor necessarily, or probably, optimal. B/H
did not attempt to specify a loss function, which
the authorities might seek to minimize. It is, how-
ever, worth noting that a choice of horizon around
four to six quarters, based on (annualized) quarterly
(rather than average annual) inflation rates, mini-
mized both output and inflation volatility. Using a
quarterly, rather than an annual, inflation measure
tends to lead to a shorter implied lag measure.
The Batini/Nelson Study
Subsequently in 1999, Batini and Nelson (B/N)
have further extended this exercise in their work
in progress at the Bank of England (“Optimal
Horizons for Inflation Targeting,” Draft July 1999).
I hope that a revised version of this will be ready
for circulation as a working paper reasonably soon.
Unlike B/H, B/N do employ a loss function in which
deviations of the output gap and of inflation from
its target value enter, in the benchmark case with
equal weight; it also incorporates a specific discount
factor. To explore the optimal horizon question,
they then look at several small models: a one-lag
four-equation quarterly vector autoregression
(VAR) and several variants of the calibrated model
used in B/H.4
They approach the question of appropriate
horizons using two alternative criteria: First they
minimize the loss function to obtain an optimal
policy horizon. Here the optimal horizon is not a
choice variable, but is determined by the loss min-
imization exercise. The second approach, rather
more akin to B/H, is to examine a simpler feedback
rule (i.e., simpler than the OC approach) where
interest rates are set in relation to the deviation of
forecast future inflation from the target at period
k; thus, 
(see B/N, p. 24).
The question then is which is the best value
of k, i.e., the value which will minimize the loss
function (when a simple rule of this kind is being
followed). But the choice of k obviously depends
on Ψp, so that they term optimal feedback horizons
(OFH) the choice of k when Ψp is also optimal and
feedback horizons (FH) when Ψp is not optimal.
The loss that will be suffered in the economy
depends on the nature of the shock that disturbs it
(e.g., whether a demand, supply, or exchange rate
shock) and on the assumed model, in particular
whether the economy is supposed to be backward
looking, as in most VAR models, or forward looking,
as in some variants of the calibrated B/H model.
This means, unfortunately, that the optimal policy
horizon appears highly sensitive to shock-specific
and model-specific factors; see for example their
Table 4. By contrast the OFH works off the devia-
tion of forecast from target inflation (whatever may
cause that deviation) and so is in a sense immune
to the identification of the disturbing shock, though
it too is highly sensitive to the specific model of
the economy adopted.5 Using one of their earlier
criteria for this, B/N then examine by what date
(policy horizon [PH]) the economy, which follows
an OFH, will achieve a convergence of inflation to
the target. They find, in their Table 9, that the OFH
is, in all cases, shorter than the PH; or, in simpler
terms, if you want inflation to converge to target at
t+x, you need, when using a simple rule adjusting
for forecast deviations (from target), to work off
deviations at t+x–q, where q>0.
It is not, however, also necessarily the case that
the OFH is shorter than the optimal policy horizon
(OPH). This OPH depends on the nature of the dis-
turbing shock which has to be identified exactly to
estimate an OPH, whereas in the estimation of the
PH, B/N assume that the disturbance reflects the
   
ip E tt t k =− () −+ Ψ 1ππ *
4 In assessing (optimal) policy horizons in such a model-based con-
text, any stabilizing rule for interest rate decisions will bring infla-
tion close to, but not exactly equal to, a point target. Consequently
B/N define the horizon in various ways, either as the period when
inflation converges to within a specified range around a point tar-
get, or when a given fraction of the initial shock is permanently
eliminated.
5 Essentially, the criterion used for deriving the OFH makes B/N
select optimal k in the presence of all three shocks simultaneously
in stochastic simulations, with the importance of each shock depend-
ing both on how strongly it enters the model’s structural equations
and on the shock variance-covariance matrix. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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historical average of all the various shocks. The
OPH depends on both the model and the shock. In
general, the OFH is again shorter than the OPH in
the face of demand or supply shocks, but in three
of the four models it is much longer in response to
exchange rate shocks.
Preliminary Conclusions
My own reaction to this work included some
concern over (i) the multiplicity of variants, some
of which (e.g., whether or not interest rate smooth-
ing might be adopted) have been glossed over
here, and (ii) the extent to which the numerical
results seemed sensitive to the precise specifica-
tion (e.g., of model, shock, and loss function).
These concerns are not that the work is wrong,
rather that it seems doubtful how much it can
illuminate and ease the difficult decisions facing
policymakers. In practice it is rarely clear how far
an actual forecast deviation of inflation from tar-
get is due to one or another shock. How far such
an exercise, whether to examine OPHs or OFHs,
could be applied to the much larger and more
complex models actually used in most real-life
forecasting exercises, including those in the Bank,
remains an open question. Whereas the B/H exer-
cise gave some comfort (to me at least) that the
policy processes in the Bank were pretty much on
course, the B/N paper suggests (to me at least) that
selection of (optimal) horizons is so model/context
specific that little advance can be made unless
such studies can be brought to apply to the specific
model/context under consideration as used in
practice by the MPC. Whether that can be done in
practice has yet to be seen.
III. THE PROSPECTIVE FUTURE TIME
PATH OF INTEREST RATES
The Prima Facie Case Against a
Constant Time Path
As is well known, the MPC’s forecast is con-
ditioned on the assumption that, between the
starting date of the forecast and the two-year hori-
zon, the short-term nominal policy–determined
interest rate will be held constant. Initially this
assumption was adopted in some large part be-
cause the forecast was done by the Bank, but the
future decisions were taken by the Chancellor, and
the Bank could not be seen publicly to second-
guess what the Chancellor might do in future.
But that quasi-constitutional constraint has
gone. In formal constitutional terms the MPC can,
if it so wishes, indicate its own future expectations.
Meanwhile continuing to adopt a (formally non-
binding) assumption might seem to limit artificially
the range of options that could be considered, at
least in public. It would only be by extraordinary
accident that the best, optimal, plan would be to
consider a change of interest rates today and then
intend to hold rates constant at this (new) level for
the next eight quarters.
Moreover, we know that holding nominal
interest rates constant tends to lead to Wicksellian
instability.6 In practice, the rate of change of most
variables visible at the two-year horizon in the
Bank’s forecast generally (though not invariably)
tends to persist, and on occasion to accelerate, in
the third and subsequent years. Consequently, any
simulation, or other model exercise, with a hori-
zon (much) beyond two years requires bolting on
to the initial premise of rates being unchanged for
two years—an auxiliary assumption that at some
point (after the two-year horizon) the unchanged
interest rate starting-point is shifted to the adoption
of some stabilizing rule for nominal interest rates
(e.g., a Taylor rule with appropriately chosen co-
efficients). Such a joint system might be described
as spatchcocked, or at least inelegant (a term of
some considerable opprobrium in academic cir-
cles!).7 There are, however, other reasons to wonder
whether the width of the fan charts is quite correct
(e.g., it is based largely on historical averages). My
own feeling is that, whereas the above criticism is
formally valid, it is not a matter of great signifi-
cance. I can happily live with it.
Finally, it is not surprising that market expec-
tations are often for a future time path of interest
rates that is far from constant. Not only will an
assumed future constant path in the MPC forecast
often not be seen as the most likely, or highly
6 In the U.K., government expenditure plans are specified in nominal
terms. Hence any shift in inflation implies offsetting projections for
real government expenditures. This conditioning assumption can
strongly dampen any tendency towards Wicksellian instability.
7 A minor variant of the same criticism is that the inflation/output
fan charts are misleadingly wide, especially in the second year. If
inflation did appear to be diverging from target so much, surely the
MPC would respond and such response would dampen the diver-
gence (e.g., Flemming, 1999)? That criticism could, in principle, be
met by applying a “rule”-based response to divergences (beyond a
certain range). But, again, such a combination of a constant-path
assumption for the modal (most likely) projection and a rule-based
path for divergences could also be described as spatchcocked and
inelegant.172 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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credible outcome, but it also causes internal com-
plications for the MPC’s own forecasting process.
Wherever current behavior depends on future
expectations of interest rates, as is the case notably
with exchange rates (e.g., under any form of the
uncovered interest rate parity [UIP] hypothesis),
then the MPC’s forecast involves the prediction that
the market’s expectations will be systematically
falsified, based on the assumption that short-term
interest rates do remain constant. That means that
the MPC forecast must contain a tricky assumption
about how the market would react to a (systematic)
string of falsified expectations—not an easy matter.
The MPC is fully aware that its conditioning
assumption of constant future interest rates does
not accord, most of the time, with the implicit
forward rate expectations of the market, as for
example derivable from a market yield curve. There-
fore, it also publishes a fan chart of the projected
inflation and output outcomes that it forecasts
would result if the markets’ (calculated) expected
time path for interest rates was to take place (e.g.,
as shown in the February 2000 Inflation Forecast,
Figure 4). Casual observation will, however, show
that the deviation of forecast inflation in the MPC’s
own forecasts from its (2.5 percent) target is gener-
ally wider at the 18- to 24-month horizon for the
forecast with (calculated) market rates than with
the MPC forecast conditioned on constant rates.
The implication is that policy making rests on the
MPC’s conditioned forecast, with the market rate
forecast presented also to help inform outside
observers of what might happen if the market’s
implied predictions were to occur.
So the forecast, conditioned on constant
interest rates, is the more important for U.K. policy-
making purposes. The case against the constant
interest rate assumption has several facets: it is
unnecessary; it would seem to imply often (if
taken as a binding constraint rather than as a
conditioning assumption) a probably suboptimal
decision; it is often hardly credible as the most
likely outcome; and it involves various forecasting
and simulation problems.
As the first draft of this paper was being
written, this criticism surfaced in an International
Monetary Fund working paper by Martijn and
Samiei (1999). They argue that
The problem [of the credibility of the
Bank’s inflation forecast] is compounded
by the absence of an explicit assessment
of the likely future path of the interest rate
in the Report. While more recently there
has been an effort to emphasize alterna-
tive views held by MPC members, the pri-
mary inflation forecasts are made under
the assumption of unchanged interest
rates. In principle, there are many interest
rate profiles that could deliver an inflation
of 2.5 percent two years ahead. Clearly, and
as discussed in the previous section, there
is no reason to suppose that a policy that
holds interest rates unchanged and delivers
a two-year ahead inflation of 2.5 percent
is necessarily superior to other policies.
The Inflation Report, therefore, appears
to lack transparency and credibility in rela-
tion to its inflation forecast. It is not obvi-
ous to what extent the inflation forecast
based on constant interest rates is an expo-
sitional or an operational construct. If it is
the latter, the MPC indeed does not intend
to smooth interest rates, and consistently
expects to hit the target at the newly set
rate. In that case the framework is trans-
parent, but, given a history of interest rate
smoothing, it is not considered credible by
market participants, as is evidenced by the
deviating market forecasts…On the other
hand, the constant interest rate assumption
may merely be an expositional tool. In this
case, the MPC in fact considers that further
interest changes are likely to be necessary,
even in the absence of news, implying that
the MPC’s forecasts lacks transparency as
well as credibility. (pp. 15-16)
But What Alternative Procedure Would
Be Better?
While the constant rate assumption undoubt-
edly has certain shortcomings, the question then
becomes, What are the alternatives that might be
proposed and are they preferrable?
One alternative would be to have the MPC
decide, and vote, not just on the change in interest
rates this month but also on the whole prospective
path up to some (arbitrary) horizon in a discretion-
ary mode. But there is a virtually infinite set of
possible time paths, delivering convergence to the
inflation target at a wide range of policy horizons.
The space of choice becomes so great that it is
hard to see how a committee could ever reach aFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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majority for any particular time path. A great ad-
vantage of restricting the choice to what to do
now, this month, is that it makes the decision rel-
atively simple, even stark. Given the difficulties
involved already in achieving majority agreement
in the MPC on this simple decision, the idea of
trying to choose a complete time path by dis-
cretionary choice seems entirely fanciful and
counterproductive. 
That means that the future time path would
have to be determined in some other fashion. A
standard academic approach would be by optimal
control procedures, i.e., minimizing a loss function
applied to the forecast. There are a variety of prob-
lems with this. First, formally establishing such a
loss function, unless it was agreed by the Chan-
cellor, might be seen as the MPC abrogating the
right to select its own (short-term) goals; it could
be thought to involve a “democratic deficit.” Against
that, it could be argued that the Chancellor’s letter,
as outlined previously, does provide some tightly
limited room for discretion by the MPC to apply a
(short-run) loss function, recognizing that “the
actual inflation rate will on occasions depart from
its target as a result of shocks and disturbances.
Attempts to keep inflation at the inflation target in
these circumstances may cause undesirable vola-
tility in output.” That discretion is limited by the
requirement to write a letter to the Chancellor if
inflation deviates from target by more than 1 per-
cent. If, in such circumstances, the MPC proposed
to return inflation to target more or less rapidly
(than the Chancellor wished), given the projected
effects of that on the prospective path of output,
the Chancellor could tell the MPC to adjust its plans
according to his own preferences.
Second, it might be difficult for a committee
to agree on any formal functional representation.
The coefficients in the function would be some-
what arbitrary (and what would be done about
the standard central bank practice of interest rate
smoothing?). Moreover, membership of the com-
mittee is time-varying, and existing members may
find that their views about the (short-run) loss
function shift as the context changes. In short,
choosing a formal loss function might need to be
revisited on each relevant occasion, running into
exactly the same problems of complexity for deci-
sion-making that were outlined above.
Third, it is not clear that optimal control proce-
dures could be applied in practice to larger, messy
forecasting models incorporating a wide variety of
subjective assumptions, residual adjustments, and
such other discretionary adjustments as the MPC
applies to its own forecast. It is far from clear that
such techniques can make the large jump from
small (two to six) equation models, with often sty-
ilized shocks, to real live forecasting models with a
much messier context. That still has to be seen. 
Fourth, if such optimal control procedures
were applied to the forecast, the resulting outcome
of time paths for interest rates, inflation, etc., would
become a hideously complex interaction of fore-
cast and OC procedure. It is already difficult enough
for MPC members to understand all the nuances
of their own forecast, even when conditioned on
relatively simple assumptions. Introducing OC
procedures as well might lead MPC members to
regard the whole exercise as a mysterious “black
box” whose entrails were only comprehensible to
a tiny number of staff academic specialists.
Fifth, if the MPC should find it more difficult
to understand how the resultant outcome for the
relevant variables had been determined, how
would it be possible to explain it to the public, or
to justify the decisions that would hang in part
from it? To say that we have done what our model
told us was best to do is not very convincing, espe-
cially given the track record of fancy economic
models.
Those considerations suggest that, for the time
being, a no-change assumption for interest rates
could not be replaced by a full optimal control exer-
cise, but would need to be replaced by some simpler
rule, e.g., a forward-looking Taylor rule. That runs
into the difficulty that there are a plethora of such
potential rules. The R/S paper described in Section I
mentions at least six types of rules (inflation devi-
ation, the Taylor rule, a forward-looking Taylor rule,
an instrument rule working off a rule-consistent
inflation forecast, a strict inflation target, and a flex-
ible inflation target). Each rule would need auxiliary
decisions on parameters, including interest-rate
smoothing and horizon. The optimality of any rule
is almost certainly model dependent. Using a sim-
plified model in the U.S., R/S have done some work
on what might be the best buy amongst such rules.
What might be the best choice of rule for the U.K.
in the context of our actual forecasting model is
far from clear. Much more work on how the time
paths of the relevant variables (including interest
rates) might look if various alternative rules were
to be adopted would seem to be required before174 JULY/AUGUST 2001
REVIEW
one could be confident that one was not jumping
out of the frying pan into the fire, if one was to
replace the constant assumption by a future “rule.”
Moreover the adoption of any such “rule”
would not eliminate some of the criticisms ap-
plied to the constant interest rate assumption. For
example, the “rule”-related interest rate path would
still normally deviate from market expectations,
thereby requiring some kind of expectation correc-
tion mechanism to be applied to the exchange rate
forecast. Second, in some circumstances a “rule”-
based forecast for the time path of interest rates
might have as little, or less, credibility as a constant
forecast, e.g., in the aftermath of an asset price
shock. Consider for example whether a “rule”-based
forecast would have given a credible projection in
autumn 1998 in the aftermath of the Russian
default, the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM)
hedge fund crisis, and the weakening of business
confidence.
Moreover a “rule”-based forecast shares some
of the potential faults of an optimal control fore-
cast. It adds to the complexity of the forecast and
makes the outcome less transparent to all con-
cerned. It thereby makes it harder to explain and
to justify to the general public. Nevertheless the
constant conditioning assumption does play some
part in guiding the decision on interest rates; at
least I know that it did so in my own case. As al-
ready noted, there are other paths for interest
rates that would not only achieve the target at the
18- to 24-month horizon, but also would at the
same time potentially improve some subsidiary
objective.
Let me consider two cases. First the time path
for output might be projected to be unstable. If
interest rates were planned to be, say, lower initially,
and then subsequently higher (than the constant)
path, it could simultaneously achieve both the
inflation target and a smoother path for output.
Second, certain asset prices might cause concern
because of the potential effect of “boom and
bust” on both the economy and on the financial
system. Say housing prices were rising much too
fast. Then a policy of higher interest rates in the
short run, followed by (an expectation of) lower
rates thereafter, might be desirable. So the question
of whether one should necessarily condition the
forecast on an assumption of future constant (short-
term) interest rates actually maps into (overlaps
with) the issue of whether, and how, one might
take asset prices into consideration in determining
interest rate policy (see Cecchetti et al., 2000).
In this context, simplicity is a virtue. One simple
approach would be to augment the forecast based
on the constant conditioning assumption, with two
other modal forecasts for output and inflation.8 In
these two latter forecasts, the short-term interest
rate would first be 0.5 percent lower/higher, respec-
tively, for say the next three quarters,9 and then
raised over the following five quarters to whatever
level was calibrated as necessary to hit the infla-
tion target on average between 18 and 24 months
hence.10
The publication of three alternative interest
rate paths, each of them consistent with achieving
the inflation target at the 18- to 24-month horizon,
might lessen the pressures to act now, since even
with no further action immediately in prospect
the target could still be hit. As we shall discuss fur-
ther later, this reduces the discipline on the MPC
itself. In return, and in exchange, it would provide
the MPC with more flexibility to pursue subsidiary
objectives (as already noted). Finally, although it is
a simple and almost Spartan proposed mechanism
(involving Charts A through C, a mock-up of which
is shown in Figure 4) that is based on simple (but
arbitrary) conditioning assumptions, it could still
be subject to the criticism of fine-tuning.
Flexibility and Commitment
If one adopts a “rule,” there is some implication
that one will follow that path. The constant, no
change, assumption is clearly exactly that—an
assumption not a rule. No one infers any commit-
ment from the MPC to abide by that assumption
in the future, nor is the credibility of the MPC
damaged when, having made this assumption in a
forecast one month, it decides to change interest
8 One could reasonably assume that the variance and skews would
be much the same in all three cases.
9 Two quarters would, perhaps, be too short to show much relevant
difference. Four quarters would probably require too sharp a subse-
quent reversal to hit the inflation target given lags in the transmis-
sion mechanism.
10 It should, however, be noted that this proposal, which emphasizes
the future prospective reversal of a current move, is almost the
exact opposite of Woodford’s (2000) proposal for emphasizing iner-
tial prospective continuations. He places weight on the importance
of influencing long rates by commitment to a series of moves in
short rates. If the above prospective reversals were credible, then
the temporary prospective move in short rates would have very lit-
tle, or no, effect on long rates. Whether that matters depends, in
some large part, on whether the transmission mechanism runs
largely via changes further out along the yield curve.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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rates even in the next month if the “news” should
appear to warrant it.
There is something special about zero, no
change. Any indication that the MPC is formally
indicating a future specific change in rates (e.g., as
driven by a “rule”-based formula) would be taken
to indicate some degree of commitment. It is my
view that the few experiences in the past where
the MPC has given any measure of commitment
(e.g., in August 1997) were soon felt to be burden-
some and unhappy.
Moreover, the extent of any such commitment
may be interpreted differently by the market and
even by different members of the monetary auth-
ority itself (Thornton and Wheelock, 2000). It
appeared, from a distance, to be a problem for the
FOMC in the summer of 1999 that its statements
about bias were at times misinterpreted by the
market, requiring subsequent speeches by the
Chairman to try to rectify.11 Some observers also
say that the fact that the Fed is not required to
announce the bias at the end of each meeting
has led the markets to interpret excessively the
importance of the decision to announce bias. Econ-
omists say the statement has almost no utility as a
predictive device since it is likely to give an indica-
tion of the next move in interest rates only 30 to
50 percent of the time. It was for reasons such as
this that the MPC responded to the Treasury Select
Committee of the House of Commons that it had
no wish to publish a statement about future bias.12
A bias statement is, I would suggest, much
less binding on future decisions than a quantified
projection for a future path of interest rates. Un-
foreseen events (shocks) are likely to make the
MPC depart from any such prefigured path. This
may well be seen by markets as reneging on a prior
commitment, and lead to accusations of misleading
the market. It would be extraordinarily difficult to
decide amongst ourselves, or to explain to the mar-
kets, just what extent of commitment was involved
in following a rule-based path. This was less of a
problem for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
since they projected a Monetary Conditions Index
(MCI), which specified a complex combination of
future expected developments, without implying
any specific future path either for interest rates or
for the exchange rate itself.13 The authors of the
IMF working paper, Martijn and Samiei, are aware
of this problem, but do not, in my view, give it
sufficient weight; they assume this difficulty away
when they state (p. 16), “Obviously, the Bank would
have to make it clear it was not committing itself
to a particular path, so that without loss of credibil-
ity it might revise its projection at a later date as
new information becomes available.”14
By contrast, a constant interest rate assumption
is generally perceived as involving no forward
commitment whatsoever. So it imposes no con-
straints on the MPC’s future decisions, leaving the
MPC to respond with maximum flexibility to un-
foreseen events as they occur.
There is a clear division of views about the
degree of forward signaling of, and market
11 This was underlined, even as the first draft of this paper was being
written, by a report that the “Fed [was] to examine policy bias
announcements” in the Financial Times, December 14, 1999, p.11,
by S. Fidler in Washington who reported as follows: “A policy step
taken by the Federal Reserve earlier this year aimed at increasing
the openness about its decision-making has confused financial
markets, the central bank has admitted…Despite the aim to
increase transparency about the Fed’s activities, and therefore to
calm market volatility, the bias statement is widely acknowledged
to have had the opposite effect. Critics have suggested that this is
because of widespread confusion about what the bias statement
means, confusion that appears to be shared by some Fed officials.”
12 In any case the arguments in the minutes of the MPC meetings and
the recorded individual votes give a considered view of the current
inclinations of the MPC. For example the minutes of the April 2000
meeting (¶ 29-32) report the differing views of the members of the
MPC. For example ¶ 31 states that “On one view, it would be better
not to raise rates this month. The news over the month as a whole
was inconclusive, with falls in manufacturing production, retail sales
and consumer confidence, and oil prices, but with the determinants
of domestic demand, both private and public, remaining robust.
Against that background other factors were also important. First, the
extent of price pressures stemming from the labour market required
further analysis, not least in disentangling the effects of bonuses
and other elements of wage drift from that of settlements. Second,
the analysis undertaken for the Inflation Report, and the opportunity
this provided to set out the Committee’s thinking in detail, were valid
reasons not to move this month unless there was a strong case to
do so. Third, for some, the volatility in equity markets introduced a
possible downside risk which might mean that any increase in rates
this month would need to be reversed soon afterwards. Finally, the
imbalances in the economy, manifested in another fall in manufac-
turing production, seemed to have worsened. An increase might
exacerbate these imbalances and it was possible that the weakness
in some sectors might feed through into the rest of the economy.
With inflation running below target, and expected to continue to do
so for a while, there was no pressing reason to raise rates straight-
away. For these members, no change in the repo rate was needed
this month, although for some of them it was more likely than not
that there would need to be an increase in rates in due course.”
13 While the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has, subsequently, aban-
doned the use of MCI, it has replaced this with a quantitative indi-
cation of the expected future path of short-term interest rates.
Whether financial markets will feel aggrieved when, and if, interest
rates depart from this prefigured path has yet to be seen.
14 In the next sentence they state that “The Bank could also include
outside projections of inflation in the Inflation Report.” We already
do, and the Inflation Report is the responsibility of the MPC, not
the Bank alone; coverage of the two differs.176 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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preparation for, future interest rate changes that
(independent) central banks regard as suitable.
The MPC certainly wants the market to be able
to predict its future moves, and I believe that its
members were not unhappy by a report that a
computer had been programmed on an in-sample
basis successfully to do so. (The program’s out-of-
sample subsequent predictive ability was less
good!) Indeed the MPC wants monetary policy to
be seen as “boring.” But the MPC wants the basis
of such predictability to be a considered assess-
ment of its “reaction function” based on published
accounts of members’ actual votes and detailed
minutes of the reasons for such votes, rather than
more speculative comments in advance of the
actual decision-making meetings of how (individ-
ual) members might vote. Given the large weight
placed on individual accountability in the MPC and
the inherent unpredictability of economic “shocks,”
any attempt to foreshadow in individual comments
the prospective future decisions of the MPC as a
whole would be seen as potentially embarrassing
hostages to fortune.
In contrast, the Fed and ECB appear to consider
the preparation of the market for future interest rate
changes, for example by public statements by the
Chairman, to be often desirable. This may reflect
in part a tendency of the Fed and the ECB to have
a more collegiate, consensual bias to decision-
making, whereas the MPC places more weight on
individual responsibility. It would be an interesting
exercise to try to ascertain whether central banks
differ significantly in their propensity to signal
future interest rate moves, and, if so, what might be
the causes and consequences of such differences.
But that exercise has not yet been done. 
How one might define “a signal” would itself
be difficult to determine. In the absence of such
an exercise, further discussion of “signaling”
would take me beyond the self-imposed limits of
this paper.
What Are the Consequential Incentives
for Behavior?
Publishing the forecast for inflation, together
with the assumption of constant interest rates from
the forecast date to the horizon, has the effect of
inducing the MPC to act now to adjust expected
inflation at the appropriate horizon into line with
the target. If the MPC could choose a time-varying





% Level of Inflation
21/2
Chart A   
Interest Rates
    0 2
1
5
    1
2
3
4FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
JULY/AUGUST 2001      177
defer interest rate changes until it was possible to
learn more about evolving conditions.
There is a developing debate in the academic
literature between those who suggest gradual
changes in interest rates (for example, because of
uncertainty about key parameters in the model
[Brainard uncertainty], about possible errors in the
data, and about opportunities for learning) and
those who argue for more aggressive and preemp-
tive action (e.g., the need for robust policy responses
and minimizing potentially large errors). It is my
conjecture that the choice of a constant versus a
time-varying interest rate path has similar implica-
tions. The assumption of a constant interest rate
path (plus a published forecast) may be thought
to induce the MPC into early preemptive action.
Whether or not “gradualism” or “preemptive”
action is generally preferable is too large a subject
to enter into here. My conjecture is that our proce-
dure tilts us in the direction of early, preemptive
actions, and my personal viewpoint is that this is
desirable.
The working paper from the IMF is less than
appreciative, or fair, in this respect. The authors do
not seem to realize that publishing the forecast in
this way forces us to act now on interest rates in
order to drive inflation to its target level 18/24
months hence. Instead they question whether the
forecasts are “credible.” Thus they state:
Since the MPC took over the job of mone-
tary policy decision making, the analysis
and the inflation forecasts reported in the
Inflation Report cannot be treated as those
of an independent reviewer: the body that
makes interest rate decisions also assesses
these decisions. As a result, it would be
difficult to envisage a situation where the
forecasts suggest that the two-year ahead
inflation, on which public scrutiny tends
to focus, would (in probabilistic terms) be
missed, because then the report would in
fact be questioning the committee’s own
policy decisions. Indeed, since the Bank
became independent, two-year ahead
inflation has always been around the tar-
get. While this is possible logically, it rais-
es questions as to the credibility of the
Bank’s inflation forecast. (p. 15)
In so far as this suggests that, rather than adjust
interest rates to hit the target, we manipulate the
forecast to appear to be hitting the target, it is a
slur which members of the MPC would find offen-
sive. Moreover in the large scale exercise involved
in such a forecast, involving many Bank staff as
well as all the MPC, such cosmetic manipulation
could not get done without notice and huge risk of
becoming publicly known.
One syndrome that I sometimes seem to per-
ceive (both in myself and occasionally also in
others) is the belief that the quantum of uncertainty
(fog) will be reduced by waiting (e.g., to make a
decision). Current shocks, implausible data points,
and unintelligible anomalies are always very clear.
But the mean expectation of future shocks is zero;
hence, some of us may tend to assume implicitly
that they will actually turn out to be zero. If that
were so, uncertainty would indeed reduce over
time. But subject to a qualification below, the dis-
tribution of shocks is constant over time; so, the
best expectation of the future quantum of uncer-
tainty is that it will be constant. If, as I believe,
uncertainty myopia exists, then a procedure forcing
an early decision may well be desirable.15
When I was a member of the MPC I thought
that I was trying, at each forecast round, to set the
level of interest rates so that, without the need for
future rate changes, prospective (forecast) inflation
would on average equal the target at the policy
horizon. This was, I thought, what the exercise was
supposed to be. But, if so, one might have expected
short-term interest rates to follow, at least to a rea-
sonable approximation and from quarter to quarter
(not month to month), a random walk. But, in prac-
tice, changes in interest rates appear to have been
just as serially correlated and gradual thus far under
the MPC as in previous regimes and in other coun-
tries. If, however, we recognize that the appropriate
periodicity is quarterly, then there have been only
12 observations of the MPC period, which is short
for any formal testing of whether there was any
significant shift in the extent of serial correlation.
Nevertheless my (casual) observation suggests
there was not. Why? My preliminary hypothesis is
that, during this period at least, there was some
15 There may be some seasonal patterns in uncertainty. There is some
tendency in the U.K. for large negatively correlated movements in
consumption in December and January, so assessment of consump-
tion trends may be better left till late winter. Again, wage settlements
and bonus payments tend to be concentrated in the winter and
spring, so there is more uncertainty in December-June than in July-
November. There are other instances of time-varying uncertainty
relating to holidays, budget dates, etc. More research could be done
to ascertain whether such seasonal patterns in uncertainty really do
exist; it would be a nice simple exercise.178 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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serial correlation in the forecasting process itself,
i.e., that, whenever inflationary pressures were on
the upward tack, or alternatively the downward
tack, the forecasters initially underestimated the
extent of such pressures. If so, the forecasters
were playing “catch up,” and that led the MPC into
a series of auto-correlated sequential decisions,
although the MPC was not itself consciously trying
to be “gradual” or inertial.
There is some plausibility in this hypothesis.
By definition forecasters cannot predict shocks,
such as that which hit in the late summer of 1998
or the sharper than expected recovery in 1999.
Uncertainty, herd instinct among forecasters, and
extrapolation from the past are all likely to make
the expected (forecast) path smoother than the
actual path. How far the serial correlation in
interest rates derives from serial correlation in
forecast errors, rather than from a conscious
decision-making process, has not (yet) been prop-
erly researched, and I did not have the time/capacity
to do it for this paper.
There would be considerable difficulties in
doing this exercise in any case. If you take, say, the
forecast two years hence and compare it with the
ex post outcome, then, in the interval, both mone-
tary and fiscal domestic policies will have changed,
often sharply, from those that conditioned the
original forecast. Should one do a counter-factual
by trying to adjust the outcome for the intervening
policy changes? But those policy changes will, in
turn, have partly (largely) been in response to
shocks that the original forecasters could not have
foreseen. On the other hand, if you take a very
short-term forecast, say, over the coming quarter,
there is usually sufficient inertia in the system that
it is not a “model” forecast at all. Anyhow, in the
one simple exercise that I asked to be done, the
emphasis has been put, rightly or wrongly, on the
two-quarter-ahead error in the forecast.
This is much more difficult to do for output
than for the RPIX series, because the latter never
gets revised, and the MPC puts weight on the latest
actual figure. For output, the data get continuously
revised, and the latest datum point at the time of
the forecast is, itself, provisional. Moreover the
quarterly output series are very noisy, more so
than the annualized RPIX series. Even so, I asked
the Bank staff to work out the MPC’s forecast errors
for output and inflation two quarters hence. Given
the short period, noise in the system, etc., the
results can be at most suggestive. They are noted in
Table 1. Note that there is some slight suggestion
of inflation predictions being revised upward in
the earlier part of the period despite a series of
interest rate increases; then, this same pattern
reverses in the middle of the period. This is consis-
tent with my hypothesis that “gradualism”—the
auto-correlation of interest rate movements—was,
at least during this period, partly a function of the
forecasting process and not of the decision-making
process. It would, however, take much more careful
empirical work to discover whether this was also
the case in other regimes and countries. I just do
not know, but I think it an exercise worth exploring.
IV. ON SKEWS AND ASSET PRICES
When the Bank was preparing its inflation fore-
cast as background for the Chancellor’s decision
on interest rates, the Bank could consider risks to
its forecast in an unconditional way and to the best
of my belief did so. But once the Bank obtained
operational independence, the situation changed,
since the question of what risks it would take into
account would affect the decision itself. Let me
first outline why it would affect the decision and
then go on to argue that one would want the cur-
rent decision to be affected in different ways, in
some cases not at all, depending on the particular
characteristics of each kind of risk.
When the probability distribution is sym-
metric, all three measures of central tendency
(mode, median, and mean) are the same. In such
cases the variance of the distribution, the extent of
Table 1
Error Made in Forecasting
Date of:
Forecast Outturn Output Inflation
November 97 Q1:98 –0.58 0.08
February 98 Q2:98 0.64 0.32
May 98 Q3:98 0.42 0.20
August 98 Q4:98 –0.58 –0.03
November 98 Q1:99 –0.10 –0.03
February 99 Q2:99 0.67 –0.23
May 99 Q3:99 0.91 –0.12
August 99 Q4:99 1.05 –0.03
November 99 Q1:00 –0.18 0.09
NOTE: Positive values imply an outcome greater than forecast.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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uncertainty in the forecast, tends to play virtually
no role in the interest rate decision. Discussion
about forecast variances in the MPC were usually
brief and uncontroversial; in this respect there was
a kind of certainty equivalence. Pure variance was
an academic issue.
This was not so for risk, because when we (as
MPC members) think of risk, we are generally
concerned with asymmetric possible outcomes.
Asymmetry implies skew, and skew drives the
measures of central tendency apart. The question
of which measure of central tendency one should
focus upon depends on one’s own individual loss
function.
Most forecasts, including that of the Bank,
concentrate on the most likely outcome, i.e., the
mode, and usually consider “the risks to the fore-
cast” at the tail end of the exercise. But the interest
rate decision should be taken only on the basis of
the modal outcome if the occurrence of any devia-
tion from the actual modal forecast, however small,
is taken to be catastrophic. The usual academic
assumption is that the loss function is quadratic in
deviations from the desired outcome, in which
case the focus should be on the mean forecast (not
the mode). In my own case, I could never see why
a 2 percent deviation from desired outcome was
four times as bad as a 1 percent deviation, rather
than just twice as bad. So I tended to concentrate
on the median forecast, while others of my col-
leagues focused on the mean.16 But in either case
the existence of a skew would affect our decision
on the appropriate interest rate. Unlike uncertainty
and variance, skew and risk mapped directly into
the interest rate decision. So, discussions about
risks were policy-relevant and not just academic.
But should all perceived risks affect policy now?
I would argue not. Let me take some examples.
Assume that there has been an ongoing “bubble”
in housing prices, which have been driven far out
of line with (perceived) fundamentals. The infla-
tionary effect of this is, I assume, offset by other
deflationary forces (say higher productivity) so the
modal forecast is in line with the target. The risk is
that the bubble will burst, and when it does this
will be deflationary. So, if you take account of this
risk in the forecast, the mean is driven below the
mode. So the implication is that interest rates should
now be cut!
This strikes me as a nonsensical response. The
contrary argument is that faced with such an asset
price bubble, interest rates should be (temporarily)
raised in order to check the misalignment and to
prevent it from getting further out of hand and pre-
sumably collapsing with an even bigger detonation
in the future.
This is not, alas, a hypothetical problem.
Housing prices in 1988-90 in the U.K., equity
prices in the U.S., and exchange rates in the U.K.
all raise aspects of this question of how to deal
with risk and skew. The MPC was criticized in the
press after its May 2000 inflation forecast for not
including the biggest risk of all, that of a sharp fall
back in the exchange rate (notably against the
euro), in its specific quantitative forecast. But if it
had, that by itself would have implied that interest
rates should have be tightened immediately. 
An astute reader will by now have noted that
this subject relates back to the earlier issue of
conditioning on a constant future interest rate
assumption. The point is that there are some
categories of risk which should not involve counter-
vailing action now, but only if and when they
actually occur. In the meantime there is a case for
nudging rates in the opposite direction, if that
should help to reduce the misalignment and the
risk and scale of the subsequent hard-landing col-
lapse. This latter case was made in Cecchetti et al.
(2000); it remains highly contentious. It is not the
purpose of this paper to take sides on that (and
anyhow I am ambivalent). All I want to argue is
that there exists a sizeable category of risks whose
future potential effects should be ignored in setting
interest rates today. 
Note that, so long as the inflation forecast con-
tinues to be conditioned on future unchanged
interest rates, quantitative account of such risks
are better omitted from the fan charts of output
and inflation. The Bank was actually right to do
just this in its May 2000 forecast. If all risks are to
be included in the inflation forecast uncondition-
ally, then the quid pro quo would have to be some
discussion of future, non-constant paths for interest
rates. As earlier described, this has some serious
drawbacks and disadvantages. But the choice seems
clear enough to me. Either condition on constant
interest rates and exclude a certain category of
16 Commentators might expect the nature of the (individual mem-
ber’s) loss function to be affected by the 1 percent deviation from
target, acting as a trigger for writing a letter of explanation and
intent to the Chancellor. I can only say that in my own case it did
not. Perhaps this was because inflation remained during these three
years so close to the target, both currently and at the forecast hori-
zon, that the possibility of having to write such a letter remained
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risk from the (formal) forecast or include all risks
unconditionally and describe how the future path
of interest rates might change over time in
response.
What are the characteristics of the risks that
should not lead to countervailing interest rate
adjustments now? The first, and perhaps most
important, is that the event of the risk coming into
effect should be clearly observable. Examples are
political or natural disasters (war in the Middle East,
earthquakes in Tokyo, hurricanes in Washington,
Liberal Democrats getting elected in the U.K. [only
joking], etc.), and sharp changes in asset or com-
modity prices (exchange rates, oil, equity and
housing prices, perhaps certain food prices). 
Examples where the event is not observable,
observable only with great difficulty, or observ-
able too long after the event to be useful are
changes in the non-accelerating inflation rate of
unemployment, in future (trends in) productivity,
in competitive pressures on margins (e.g., from the
Internet), on international competitiveness, etc.,
etc. In so far as there are thought to be asymmetric
risks attached to these, you need to take them into
account now because you will never find a time in
the future when you can perceive with any greater
clarity or certainty whether or not they have been
occurring.
A second, main characteristic of the risks that
policy should not try to preempt is that they are
low-probability events with a high payoff, if they
should transpire at all.17 Fortunately the list of
clearly observable risks and low-probability/high-
payoff risks overlap rather closely.
Let me again take some examples. You should
not run a systemically mildly inflationary policy
because there is a non-zero risk of a 1929 (or a
Japanese) collapse in asset prices. Nor should you
run a systematically mildly deflationary policy
because there is a non-zero chance of an exchange
rate collapse or of entering an inflationary war.18
Similarly the distinction between observable and
not-observable risks is not so easy to draw.
As far as I know the academic economics pro-
fession has not yet provided much help on the
question of how to respond to asymmetric risk.
Error terms, whether related to additive or multi-
plicative uncertainty, are universally taken to be
symmetrically distributed. Standard practice is to
run a forecast as if it was the mean of a symmetric
distribution and then to add an asymmetric risk as
an ad hoc afterthought.
Help on how better to treat asymmetric risks
would be much appreciated. Until such assistance
arrives, I stand by my view that some such risks,
i.e., clearly observable, low probability/high pay-
off risks should not induce current countervailing
action. This conclusion has, as already noted, some
implications for the conduct and public presenta-
tion of the forecast process itself.
V. CONCLUSION
It will certainly be desirable to do further
research on what either an optimal control or an
assorted rule-based model would imply in the con-
text of U.K. forecasting systems. But that should
initially be for internal use only. Whether or not
such further research might lead the MPC to change
its forecasting assumption about a constant interest
rate path is far from clear. Until such time, for the
reasons set out above, there seem to me to be good
grounds for maintaining present procedures in
this respect. Nevertheless I would see some merit
in exploring the presentation of an alternative, but
equally arbitrary, set of scenarios, as in the charts
in Section III (i.e., Figure 4).
Unless some such move is made away from
the constant assumed time path of interest rates,
those risks which should only evoke a policy
response in the (unlikely) event of them occurring
will have (to continue) to be excluded from any
quantified inclusion in the inflation forecast. Only
if the time path of interest rates can be presented
as “conditional” can risks be included in an “un-
conditional” way.
A proper research exercise should be commis-
sioned to examine whether the auto-correlation
observed in interest rates has been due to the fore-
casting process rather than to the decision-making
process.
In so far as the assumption of a constant time-
path for interest rates was taken as an effective
17 Low-probability, low-payoff risks will get ignored.
18 Considerations of this kind make me somewhat unhappy also
about the arguments of those who argue for “robust” policies (e.g.,
Sargent, 1999, and Stock, 1999). They suggest setting policy so as to
minimize the likelihood of having a really bad outcome (a form of
minimax policy). Since the worst outcome, from the point of view
of a central bank, is to find oneself powerless to prevent worsening
deviations from target, their policy prescription is to be more
aggressive. But if I give a (very) low subjective probability, say 2 per-
cent, to such an outcome (especially if I can observe it should it
happen), does it make sense to aim consciously for a poor outcome
(98 percent of the time) in order to offset a real disaster (2 percent
of the time)? FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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constraint, rather than just a conditioning assump-
tion, it would have the effect of inducing the
monetary authority to choose a probably subopti-
mal and often noncredible path. But if correctly
interpreted as just a conditioning assumption, it
simplifies the decision-making process, making it
easier to understand and to explain publicly; pro-
vides the greatest flexibility as well as minimum
forward constraint on the MPC’s future actions; and
encourages the MPC to act in a robust, preemptive
fashion.
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